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ABSTRACT 
When ubiquitous multimedia technology is introduced in an 
organization, the privacy implications of that technology are 
rarely addressed. Users usually extend the trust they have in an 
organization to the technology it employs. This paper reports 
results from interviews with 24 Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) attendees whose presentations or contributions to IETF 
sessions were transmitted on the multicast backbone (Mbone). 
Due to a high level of trust in the organization, these users had 
few initial concerns about the privacy implications of this 
technology. However, interviewees’ trust relied on inaccurate 
assumptions, since the interviews revealed a number of potential 
and actual invasions of privacy in transmission, recording and 
editing of multicast data. Previous research found that users who 
experience an unexpected invasion of their privacy are not only 
likely to reject the technology that afforded the invasion, but lose 
trust in the organization that introduced it [2,3]. We discuss a 
number of mechanisms and policies for protecting users’ privacy 
in this particular application, and propose a strategy for 
introducing networked multimedia technology in general. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The number of networked multimedia applications has increased 
rapidly in recent years. The ability to multicast audio, video and 
other data on the Internet [ll] offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to access conferences, lectures and other events 
anywhere in the world [19]. The increasing availability and 
accessibility of such multimedia data does, however, harbor 
increased risks as well as benefits [5,6]. The relationship between 
multimedia data and privacy invasion has not yet been clearly 
described. Existing legal definitions do not address the particular 
nature of multimedia data and communications - the main 
problem being that they aim to define characteristics of data and 
information, rather than how it is perceived by users [lo]. 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work to1 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that 
copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advant 
-age and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. 
To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to 
redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
ACM Multimedia ‘99 10199 Orlando, FL, USA 
0 1999 ACM l-58113-151~8/99/0010...s5.00 
Martina Angela Sasse 
Department of Computer Science 
University College London 
Gower Street, London, WC1 E 6BT 
+44 (0)20 7380 7212 
A.Sasse@cs.ucl.ac.uk 
Literature in Computer Human Interaction does discuss users’ 
perceptions of privacy, but the recommendations found tend to be 
based on anecdotal findings [5,6,13,20], or aimed at specific 
applications [16]. The aim of this study was to identify expert 
users’ perception of the privacy risks associated with Internet 
multicasting of events. Expert users were specifically chosen in 
contrast to previous studies of novice users’ perceptions of 
multicasting, video conferencing and virtual reality [2,3] where 
users had varying levels of organizational trust. 
1.1 IETF Session Multicasting 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is an open 
international community concerned with technical aspects of the 
Internet architecture and its operation, and is open to any 
interested individual. IETF standards are developed by working 
groups that communicate via email lists and meet three times a 
year. The first multicast transmission was from the IETF in 1992 
[ll]. The original idea was to construct a semi-permanent IP 
multicast test bed to carry the IETF transmissions and support 
continued experimentation between meetings. The multicasting of 
selected sessions is now an established and accepted part of the 
IETF meetings. Selected IETF sessions are multicast using 
multicast tools such as rat [15], Vie [17] and WB [18] to transmit 
audio, video and shared whiteboard data. Multicasting of the 
sessions allows those who cannot attend the IETF to follow these 
sessions remotely and ask questions. Several thousand sites all 
over the world have the connectivity and tools required to receive 
these transmissions. 
The fact that a session is multicast is noted on the IETF agenda of 
the sessions. No announcement about multicasting is made at the 
session itself, but the presence of microphones (only used for 
multicasting purposes) and cameras provide a clear visual clue. 
2. THE STUDY 
All participants who had presented at or spoken out in a 
multicast session at the 41” IETF in Los Angeles were contacted 
by email and invited to participate in an interview (lasting approx. 
30 minutes) during the 42nd IETF in Chicago. All interviewees 
were experts in computer networking. Even though the majority 
of interviewees had little experience of watching the IETF 
sessions remotely (because they usually attended the IETF in 
person), they had remotely watched other events using the same 
technology. Those interviewed were initially asked open-ended 
questions about their perceptions of multicasting and privacy 
followed by specific questions on their perceptions of the: 
. Information Receiver: who would be viewing the multicast 
sessions. 
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. Information Sensitivity: how sensitive the multimedia 
session information being transmitted was. Summarized description 
. Information Usage: the reuse of recorded multicast sessions. 
2.1 Results 
The interview data was collection and analyzed using grounded 
theory methods widely employed in social sciences [14,24]. The 
majority (67%) of respondents raised issues relating to 
information usage as the main threat to their privacy, especially 
through unauthorized editing of recorded multicast data (see 
Figure 1, Table 1). The presentation of such data out of context 
can increase the potential misinterpretation of the information. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the percentile of interviewees who 
raised a particular issue as an existing or potential threat to 
privacy. This summary does not, however, reflect how much of a 
threat any particular issue was seen to be. It is important to 
consider this because if users feel strongly about a particular 
issue, the chances of them rejecting the technology are high. In 
many situations, distributed collaborative systems have to be 
adopted by general consent; rejection of a technology by a 
minority of users can thus undermine the implementation and use 
of a technology. The detailed qualitative analysis of the responses 
revealed the relative importance of each issue. These 
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Figure 1: Users’ Perceived Privacy Problems 
results are described in detail for each cate 
by examples of users’ perceived privacy invasions. Table 1: Categories of potential privacy issues 
The transmission of non-participants’ (people who were not 
actively participating in a session) images was not only mentioned 
by 12.5% of interviewees, but was also seen to be of great 
importance by those who mentioned it: 
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“That does feel like an intrusion on your privacy, to have 
them video taping you when your just sitting off in the 
corner - you know, having a conversation with somebody 
or falling asleep. ” 
EXAMPLE: NON-PARTICIPANTS 
“Apparently one time someone was tuning in and they saw one 
of my colleagues, one of my co-workers, falling asleep in one 
of the sessions - I fall asleep in lots of the sessions - but they 
[his bosses] took him to task for it, you know ‘We saw you 
falling asleep, we didn’t send you there to fall asleep!’ you 
know. ” 
The second transmission issue relates to who receives the 
transmitted multimedia data. A quarter of the respondents 
highlighted problems associated with outsiders (people not a part 
of the IETF technicai community) viewing the sessions. 
Interviewees were, to some degree, concerned with the possibility 
that outsiders receiving the transmissions might change the 
dynamics of IETF session in two ways: 
1. “. . . it would inhibit some of the discussion. ” 
2. I‘... it would encourage people to make statements with that 
broader audience in mind as opposed to just technical 
peers. ” 
EXAMPLE: OUTSIDERS 
One interviewee recalled that the hotel in which a previous 
IETF had been held had transmitted sessions on its internal 
television network - this opened up the sessions to viewers 
who were not part of the IETF community, without speakers 
and contributors initially being aware of it. 
The third transmission issue, raised by 10% of interviewees, was 
that arguments in sessions occasionally became emotive (heated), 
and that this could be potentially embarrassing for those involved: 
“Presumably that would be the type of session 
that you’d be more likely to say something you 
didn’t intend to have publicly known. ” 
A final - minor-issue - was that remote viewers might 
misunderstand some presentations. At the IETF, attendees often 
clarify points in a discussion with the speaker or contributor after 
the session ends - remote attendees find it hard to do this. 
2. I. 2 Recording Issues 
The recotding of sessions was not a major issue although some 
interviewees highlighted that a lack of recording context (time and 
place) increased the chances of misinterpreting the session. A key 
recording issue, however, was noted as the recording of sessions 
that had become emotive (see also previous section). 
EXAMPLE: EMOTIVE SESSION RECORDING 
“Only once when I slightly lost my temper and felt more like, 
you know, some people, they save it and watch it later on. It’s 
the sort of thing that you wouldn’t want to be captured for 
ever. ” 
2.1.3 Editing Issues 
The most important issue (both in terms of percentage of 
responses and strength of feelings) was related to the editing of 
recorded sessions. Like any soundbite, sections of a multicast 
session can be presented out of context. As one interviewee 
noted: 
“It turns something into a pretty subjective interpretation 
of it. ” 
This issue increased in importance with the increased perceived 
personal representativeness of the multimedia information: 
“I think that could be a problem if you’re snarling at 
somebody and you miss all the reasons why you’re 
snarling at them - so making you look unreasonable.” 
EXAMPLE: EDITING OUT OF CONTEXT 
“Somebody told me: ‘Hey, I saw you the other day. I went to 
this workshop on multicast technology and you were talking, ’ 
and I said: ‘I wasn’t talking there. ’ They had shown like a 
demo of what a typical multicast session looked like, and it 
happened to be my presentation, and of course I hope they 
didn’t show something like when I got a lot of questions or if 
there’d been a very heated discussion and I hadn’t been doing 
very well at that discussion. I’d have found it a little bit 
embarrassing. They would show it to this group of people who 
have no idea what I’m talking about, what the subject is... In 
fact they probably wouldn’t have listened to my whole 
presentation, they probably showed the last 5 minutes - a 
snippet - and they would have taken it completely out of 
context and of course that’s not good. ” 
3. TRUST AND THE INFORMATION 
RECEIVER 
The results of this study corroborate previous findings. Most 
users of multimedia technology do not consciously assess the 
privacy implications of every situation they encounter - instead, 
trust governs the majority of users’ privacy assessments [2,3,13]. 
Previous research, into password mechanisms, however [ 1,4] has 
shown that users need to be aware of potential threats to assess 
the true risks of any particular situation. Without this awareness, 
users’ trust in the organisation will determine their perceptions of 
the situation and the positive or negative assumptions made: 
1. Positive: users assume that the technology, introduced by an 
organization they trust, is trustworthy (‘I’ve never heard of 
anything negative happening and I trust them so it must be 
okay’). If users then find that this assumption is incorrect 
(i.e. find their privacy has been invaded), this results in a 
highly emotive rejection of the technology, and often also 
destroys the previously held trust. 
2. Negative: users assume that the technology, introduced by an 
organization they distrust, is not trustworthy, causing an 
immediate rejection of the situation and the technology in 
question. (‘I’ve never heard of anything negative happening 
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therefore there must be a cover up of some terrible risks 
involved. ‘) 
The majority of interviewees showed a high level of trust in the 
organisation (IETF), and a desire to see the technology in 
question (IP multicast) succeed. Many interviewees, however, 
were not aware of the full privacy implications. As one 
respondent noted when talking about his own privacy concerns: 
“But I have no clue that that has ever happened. n 
The results highlight that many of the respondents fears have 
already occurred and are likely to continue if they are not 
addressed (see previous section - 2.1). 
Previous research [2,3,5,6] has shown that the information 
receiver is a vital part of users assessment of the privacy 
implications of information exchange. This highlights the issue of 
whether it is what is known about a person that is invasive, or who 
knows it. Most accounts of privacy have not clearly identified the 
role of the information receiver in the privacy equation. However, 
the users assessment of the information receiver will be influenced 
by: 
1. the users experience of the information receiver; 
2. a range of social and organizational norms; 
3. the particular interaction setting (environment, task, system) 
[20,23]. 
Bellotti [6] details the importance of potential infringements of 
user perceived acceptable information receivers. It is surprising 
then that many interviewees noted that the information reciever 
was not an important issue for them “... because the people that 
really matter are here, at the IETF.” The results of this study, 
however, show that there are important issues with regard to 
remote viewers, which are reliant upon the users implicit 
assumptions. Most interviewees assumed that the remote viewers 
were a small number of the same type of people that attended the 
IETF, and mainly academics (because these have easier access to 
the Mbone). When the issue of outsiders remotely viewing the 
sessions was discussed, several potential issues emerged: 
1. Changing dynamics of the sessions: the presence of outsiders 
may make people less reluctant to speak out, or encouraging 
presenters to make more “commercially acceptable” and 
“less technical” statements. 
2. Distorted impression: outsiders may gain a “distorted 
impression” of the sessions without the context required to 
understand statements made by speakers . 
Throughout our life, we belong to a number of social groups with 
differing social norms. The privacy trade-offs we make rely on the 
social norms of the group context in which they are made. We are 
happy to reveal things to our family members that we would not 
want to reveal to our colleagues at work - and vice versa. For 
each group, there is an outgroup - those who are not members of 
that particular community. Acceptable practices are governed by 
the relevant community-determined social norms and social 
controls, which establish a culture of use for technologically- 
mediated communications [23,13]. 
For most interviewees, the benefits of multicasting sessions for 
within-community members who cannot attend the IETF 
outweighed the potential risks associated with sessions being 
viewed by outsiders. The same trade-off, however, did not apply 
to the hotel-internal transmission of IETF sessions. The benefits 
of attendees viewing sessions in their hotel room was not as great 
to the respondents (thus enough to outweigh the privacy 
negatives) as remote non-attendees viewing sessions. It is 
important to understand these privacy trade-offs so that the 
privacy effects of changing circumstances can be assessed prior to 
users loosing their trust in the organisation. 
4. PRIVACY TRADE-OFFS 
Relying merely on social controls for safeguarding privacy is 
dangerous [5]. Nevertheless, users do trade off privacy for 
perceived benefits in information usage. Identifying benefits of 
the technology, as well as privacy issues, is therefore vital. The 
public forum nature of the IETF was cited by many interviewees 
as a benefit that outweighed (for those presenting or contributing 
to a session) the majority of privacy risks associated with session 
multicasting. The same interviewees, however, were not 
necessarily prepared to accept the risks for non-participant 
attendees being shown on camera. The key issue here is that, at 
the sessions, attendees can see the people who can see them, and 
thus assess the associated privacy risks. If you know your boss is 
watching, you can make sure you look alert and interested. 
Remote viewers, however, are hidden, and so are the privacy 
risks. Some interviewees also argued that multicasting of this 
public forum retained the same risks as other forms of 
communication, such as email lists or bulletin boards. Textural 
media, however, usually provide some form of contextualisation - 
such as the date when a message was posted. This reduces the 
chance of a ten-year old comment being viewed as being made 
yesterday. 
Bellotti & Sellen [S] argue that the ubiquity of unobtrusive 
technology increases the risk of privacy invasion. It is becoming 
very easy to generate and capture large amounts of data, but there 
are few corresponding mechanisms to provide users with control 
and feedback about its use. If such mechanisms were considered 
in the design and implementation of multimedia communications 
technology, the risk of privacy intrusions would be greatly 
reduced. However, though much of the data collected nowadays 
identifies individuals, the majority of people do not considered it 
as invasive. It is, therefore, users’ perception of the information, 
which is of importance. Many contributions to the privacy debate 
often make a simple binary private - not private distinction, by 
devising privacy mechanisms for either all information or just 
‘personal information’ without clearly defining what this term 
means to the user. In previous work on users’ perception of 
authentication mechanisms [1,4], the concept of information 
sensitivity was identified. Users rated certain types of information 
in degrees of sensitivity. This perception, in turn, determined the 
amount of effort expended by them on reviewing and maintaining 
that information. Further research into users’ perceptions of 
privacy have verified the importance of this privacy factor [2,3] 
The study detailed in this paper also corroborates previous 
research which identified that information and thus its sensitivity 
can be interpreted at different levels [2,3]. Primary information 
relates to the topic of discussion, whilst secondary information 
relays other interpretative social or psychological characteristics 
about the user via auditory, visual or textural media. With 
increasing richness of data, there is an increase in secondary-level 
information (the way someone sounds, looks etc.). The majority 
of interviewees perceived the risk of having their privacy invaded, 
via the multicasting of sessions, as low because of its content (‘We 
104 
don’t even want to listen to this - who else would?‘). Privacy 
problems arise when only the information’s primary level is 
reviewed for potential privacy risks. The interviewees were rating 
the sensitivity of IETP session data on the basis of its technical 
content (primary level). However, the recorded sessions could be 
viewed, at a secondary level, e-g: 
9 illustrate mistakes commonly made in presentations; 
ii) study the behavior of “techies”; 
iii) study how people from different ethnic backgrounds act 
and react in an argument. 
At this secondary level, the data of technical debates could 
suddenly seem very personal, and its use perceived as highly 
intrusive. With the recording of this multicast information the 
associated privacy risks are higher than with, as one respondent 
pointed out, a documented record of events:- 
“Although that kind of thing might not get reflected in 
the minutes as much - the level of emotion. I mean the 
argument might get reflected but the emotion won’t be. 
How long did Z yell - you know. ” 
The key factor here is the realisation that a misjudgement has been 
made. The information providers’ assessment of the risk involved 
in the situation was inaccurate, and thus their control of the 
potentially invasive material has been lost [6]. Although 
misjudgements of the potential invasiveness of information can be 
made in normal situations, complex problems arise when 
technology inadvertently supports these misinterpretations. This 
highlights the importance of keeping data in its context [12]. 
How personally identifiable information is used 
(information usage) has always been of key importance to people 
with regard to privacy, and this is the main area where privacy is 
often dramatically noted as having been invaded (e.g. 
organisations discriminating against employees who they know 
have taken an HIV test). Users’ fears about the use of technology 
are often said to come down to a fear of what information will be 
used for. It is not only how information is used, but the form it 
takes which may make it potentially invasive. A lack of 
contextual elements in information processing and usage is a key 
factor in privacy invasions [12]. This becomes doubly important 
in multimedia communication, as the perception of ‘II picture 
doesn’t lie’, although inaccurate, still prevails to some extent [20]. 
Ultimately, most of the trade-offs that information providers make 
rely on trust relationships within the relevant communities. Many 
acceptable practices within multimedia communications rely on 
an equitable ratio of perceived benefits, traded-off against the 
perceived risks. It is not an equal balance between perceived 
benefits and costs that is vital in an acceptable trade-off, but 
changes to a perceived acceptable ratio [7]. Someone may be 
contributing more than others in a social interaction, but they find 
this acceptable unless this balance is changed - especially without 
their knowledge. Bellotti 6r Sellen’s [5] research at EuroPARC 
found that privacy was not a major issue in the organizational 
multimedia communication application reviewed, as benefits were 
traded-off against potential concerns. Users low level of privacy 
concerns were due to the general environment of trust, and the 
development of acceptable practices relating to the application’s 
usage. However, it must be understood that once this trust has 
been broken by a perceived privacy invasion, emotive responses 
and a potential rejection of the technology is likely to occur [2,3]. 
The results detailed in this paper show that the majority of 
interviewees saw the context of information as a major privacy 
problem which can be highlighted by one respondents’ 
comments:- 
‘I don’t mind editing in principle -just the way it seems 
to happen in practice that I seem to mind. ” 
When low-sensitivity information is taken out of context, it cm 
sometimes become highly sensitive, personal representational 
information (at the secondary level) showing the user in a bad 
light. By editing sections of audio, video or a still image, 
someone can change how and what a person says, and even to 
whom they say it. However, as the majority or respondents had 
not personally felt this invasion of privacy occur, they are still 
open and responsive to actions being taken to address this 
potential problem. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Mayer et al. [21] identify a strong need for users’ trust 
in organisations of the future, and emphasise the difficulty in 
maintaining these trust relationships. Tire study reported in this 
paper identified a high level of trust by the interviewees in the 
organisation in question. However research has shown [2,3] that 
if the privacy issues highlighted are not addressed before they 
become paramount, this may decrease the trust bond between the 
organisation and the information providers (in this case, 
presenters and contributors). The trade-off between perceived 
benefits and privacy risks made by information providers relies on 
assumptions that may be inaccurate. In order to retain system 
users’ organisational trust levels, they must be informed of 
potential privacy risks (to make accurate risk assessments). In 
addition, the following issues should be addressed: 
5.1 Information Receiver 
. Provide clear feedback - on who is viewing sessions 
remotely or who may be viewing recordings in the future - 
thus relaying to the user potential risks of those outside the 
community viewing the sessions. 
. Assess risk of new media - review whether the benefits of 
using a networked multimedia application outweigh potential 
privacy concerns. Changes in distribution procedures (e.g 
hotel TV distribution) will have an effect on who the 
potential information receiver is which, in turn, will effect 
the privacy trade-off made by the system user. A simple 
privacy risk assessment of the situation by the system 
administrators prior to any changes made could avoid 
potentially serious repercussions. 
5.2 Information Sensitivity 
. Assess risk of camera shots - are camera sweeps necessary? 
Which camera views are potentially sensitive or 
embarrassing? Previous research has suggested providing 
feedback to [5,6] or informed consent and permission from 
[20] those whose image is being broadcast or recorded. 
However, in many situations this course of action would be 
impractical (e.g providing all IETP attendees with feedback 
on all potential privacy risks from transmitting data). 
Ultimately, an initial appraisal of the importance and 
associated privacy risks of the information being captured is 
all that is required (e.g. how important is the information, 
how sensitive could the information be, do those being 
broadcast know the risks involved). 
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. Contextaalise multimedia data - embed a visible date/time- 
stamp and name of the event in multicast video data [22]. 
The importance of contextualising video data has been 
commented on by several other authors [12,13,20]. We 
suggest that this simple, easily added feature could provide a 
first step towards preventing data being used out of context, 
intentionally or unintentionally. 
. Sensitivity feedback to the information receiver - all actual 
invasions of privacy reported by the interviewees in our 
study were unintentional, i.e. the information receivers did 
not realize that their use of the data was an infringement of 
the information broadcasters’ privacy. One way of raising 
information receivers’ awareness of privacy issues would be 
through transmitting explicit statements of what constitutes 
“acceptable use” of the data - and what does not - at the 
beginning and end of a session. A second way would be by 
embedding permission-type tags in the transmitted data and 
displaying an alert when potentially unacceptable actions 
(e.g. such editing of an audio stream) are performed by the 
information receiver (see below). 
5.3 Information Usage 
. Implement digital watermarking and watercasting - 
incidents of copying and editing of multimedia data can be 
traced if transmitted data are marked using these techniques 
[9,8]. Copied multimedia data, once identified, could be 
traced back to its origins. Sessions could be transmitted with 
an embedded mark that allows broadcasters (e.g. the speaker 
or organizer of multicast sessions) to trace their multimedia 
data used publicly elsewhere (e.g. as part of a paper or 
lecture displayed on the Web). Rather than have users 
trawling the Internet to see if, where and how their 
multimedia data is used, a webcrawler-type search engine 
could perform this task and report this information to the 
user. Information receivers could also be informed, using a 
cryptographic hash function, of edited multimedia data 
against the broadcasters’ wishes. It is important to note that 
these actions could help to provide feedback on unacceptable 
practices in multimedia usage behaviors thus developing 
social norms of expectable behaviors. 
. Keep an on-line session archive - continuation of the IETF 
recorded archive (http://imj.gatech.edu/), which was 
mentioned by some interviewees as a useful reference source 
to counteract edited versions. However, a link from an 
edited version to the original was suggested as a useful 
addition. A visual watermarked link could provide feedback 
to information receivers that 1. this version has been edited 
and 2. there is a link back to the original unedited version. 
. Editing permission policy - many respondents were only 
happy with the editing of recorded sessions if they first gave 
their permission. This requirement should be detailed on the 
IETF session archive page as well as being relayed to those 
viewing the sessions remotely. 
Within the fast changing organizations of today it is vital that 
potential privacy issues are dealt with pro-actively before it 
becomes too late to rectify the damage done. Organisations that 
wish to utilize networked multimedia technology successfully 
should acknowledge the wolf beneath the sheep’s clothing and 
take steps to tame it. If users discover it themselves by chance, 
their inclination may be to run, i.e. reject the technology. 
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